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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
W E S T G A L L E R Y CORPORA-
TION, a Utah corporation, d-b-a 
G A L L E R Y I T H E A T R E , D O N 
W A L L S and L I N D A T O L L I V E R , 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT L A K E C I T Y BOARD O F 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Defendant-Appellant. J 
B R I E F O F A P P E L L A N T 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y 
BOARD O F COMMISSIONERS 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
The plaintiffs-respondents commenced this action 
by filing their Motion for and obtaining a Restraining 
Order, which prevented defendant-appellant from hav-
ing a hearing it had called to determine whether plain-
tiffs-respondents' business and regulatory licenses 
should be revoked. The Restraining Order was granted 
giving rise to this appeal. 
Case No. 
13963 
1 
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For convenience of reference, the plaintiffs-respon-
dents will hereinafter be referred to as "Gallery", and 
the defendant-appellant will hereinafter be referred to 
as "City". 
D I S P O S I T I O N O F CASE BY L O W E R COURT 
The lower court granted Gallery's injunction per-
manently restraining the Board of City Commissioners 
from holding a hearing to determine whether Gallery's 
City granted regulatory and business licenses should 
be revoked until subsequent to the result of a criminal 
proceeding before the City Court. 
As stated in the Notice of Appeal, paragraph No. 
1 of the Order of the lower court is no longer applicable 
because Sections 20-20-18.2 through 20-20-18.12 have 
been repealed as evidenced by the certified copy of the 
Repeal of Ordinance attached to City's Notice of Ap-
peal. Nevertheless, the same arguments apply to all 
three findings of the court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
City seeks to have the lower court's Judgment rer 
versed, and a determination made that City has the 
right to proceed administratively with a license hearing 
without prior interference from the Court, and for City's 
costs. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The undisputed facts as shown by the pleadings 
and the record in this case are as follows: 
2 
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1. On the 20th day of November, 1974, City, 
after receiving complaints from citizens and law 
enforcement officers, served upon Gallery its Or-
der to answer the allegations contained in the Pe-
tition attached thereto, and if found true, to show 
cause why the business licenses granted should not 
be revoked. (Record on appeal pp. 18, 19, 20) 
2. On the 25th day of November, 1974, Gal-
lery filed its Motion seeking a Preliminary Re-
straining Order and Order to Show Cause, which 
were granted, enjoining City from proceeding with 
its administrative hearing until hearing set by the 
court. (Record on appeal pp. 31, 32) 
3. On the 25th day of November, 1974, at thp 
hour of 9:00 a.m., the court heard arguments from 
both parties and made its findings reflected in its 
Order of December 17, 1974. (Record on appeal 
pp. 35, 36) 
4. On the 14th day of January, 1975, City re-
pealed sections 20-20-18.2 through 20-20-18.12, Re-
vised Ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
5. On January 16, 1975, City's Notice of Ap-
peal was filed in this case. 
ISSUES TO BE R E S O L V E D ON A P P E A L 
1. Did the lower court exceed its jurisdiction 
and/or abuse its discretion, prior to any hearing on the 
3 
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matter by City, by taking premature jurisdiction and 
making a conclusive and final determination that the 
Board of City Commissioners could not make an execu-
tive or administrative determination of whether a film 
was obscene as grounds for revoking a license or licenses 
and that City had to wait for such a determination to be 
made by the court in a pending criminal proceeding, 
thus violating separation of governmental powers, 
2. Was the lower court ultra vires its jurisdiction 
in concluding in its Order of December 17, 1974, before 
any City hearing, that the Board of City Commissioners 
could not proceed with its Hearing to determine 
whether a movie was obscene for possible license revo-
cation purposes, when criminal charges had been filed 
against Gallery for the same acts and the basic question 
to be determined in the criminal action was whether the 
film in question was obscene. 
3. Did the lower court exceed and/or abuse its dis-
cretion or act ultra vires its jurisdiction in enjoining the 
City from further proceedings until criminal actions 
pending aganist the Gallery in the City Court had been 
concluded. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E L O W E R COURT A B U S E D I T S DIS-
C R E T I O N BY P R O H I B I T I N G T H E C I T Y 
FROM H O L D I N G AN A D M I N I S T R A T I V E 
4 
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H E A R I N G CONCERNING P O S S I B L E L I -
C E N S E REVOCATION. 
City contends that the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction to entertain or enter its Order of December 
17, 1974, and that its action in doing so was an abuse 
of the jurisdiction and discretion of the District Court. 
In entering its Order the lower court held that the City 
had no right, administratively, to set up and hold an 
Evidentiary Hearing and make a determination of 
whether it should or should not revoke licenses it has 
granted. 
A municipal governing body in this State has the 
administrative and legislative power to license and reg-
ulate businesses, Section 10-8-39, Utah Code Annotat-
ed 1953, which fairly implies that it also has the inherent 
right to withdraw licenses it may issue. See Riggins v. 
District Court, 89 Utah 183, 51 P . 2d 645, Monamotor 
Oil Co. v. Johnson (DC) 3 F . Supp. 189, affd. 292 
U. S. 86, 78 L. Ed. 1141, 54 S. Ct. 575; State ex rel 
First Presby. Church v. Fuller, 136 Fla. 788, 187 So. 
148; Hibbard S. B. & Co. v. Chicago, 173 111. 91, 50 
N. E . 256; Medias v. Indianapolis, 216 Ind. 155, 23 
N. E. 2d 590, 125 A.L.R. 590; Simmons v. State, 12 
Mo. 268; Wallace v. Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 73 P . 528; Gar-
ford Trucking Inc. v. Hoffman, 114 N.J .L. 522, 177 A. 
882; People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health, 
189 N. Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187; Hutchins v. Durham, 118 
N. C. 457, 24 S. E. 723; La Flante v. State Bd. of Pub-
5 
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lie Roads, 47 R. I. 258, 131 A. 641; Heslep v. State 
Highway Dept., 171 S. C. 186,171 S. E. 913; Sherman 
v. State Dental Examiners (Tex. Civ. App.) 116 
S. W. 2d 843; State ex relNowotny v. Milwaukee, 140 
Wis. 28, 121 N. W. 658; State ex rel Morris v. West 
Virginia Racing Comm. 133 W. Va. 179, 55 S. E. 2d 
263; Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 111. 372. 
I t has been held that to confer or attempt to confer 
upon a court of record the power to have hearings on 
license revocations was an unconstitutional invasion of 
the exclusive function of the legislative departments of 
government. See State v. Huber, 129 W. Va. 198, 40 
S. E. 2d 11, 168 A.L.R. 808, Anno, at p. 826. 
I t is the general rule that an administrative action 
which is not final, or, as in this case, has not even pro-
gressed to the hearing stage, cannot be attacked in an 
injunction proceeding by reason of the fact that absent 
a final order or decision, power has not been fully and 
finally exercised, there can be no irreparable harm, the 
administrative intention is not known, and therefore, 
the controversy is not ripe for equitable intervention. 
Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 Minn. 1, 60 N. W. 2d 18; 
Florentine v. Darien, 142 Conn. 415, 115 A. 2d 328; 
Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U. S. 426, 92 L. Ed. 784, 
68 S.-Ct 691, reh den 33 U. S. 877, 92 L. Ed. 1153, 68 
S. Ct. 900. Gallery should have exhausted its admini-
strative procedures before resorting to the courts. 
The mere fact that Gallery alleged City's acts were 
6 
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unconstitutional (Record on Appeal p. 2) was not and 
should not have been grounds to prevent the doctrine 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies from operat-
ing. Public Utilities Com. v. United States, 355 U. S. 
534, 2 L. Ed. 2d 470, 78 S. Ct. 446, reh den, 356 U. S. 
925, 2 L. Ed. 2d 760, 78 S. Ct. 713; Illinois Commerce 
Com. v. Thomson, 318 U. S. 675, 87 L. Ed. 1075, 63 
S. Ct. 834; Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 
608, 81 L. Ed. 835, 57 S. Ct. 549; First Nat. Bank v. 
Weld County, 264 U. S. 450, 68 L. Ed. 784, 44 S. Ct. 
385; People v. Calvar Corp., 286 N. Y. 419, 36 N. E. 
2d 644, 136 A.L.R. 1376; State ex rel. Employment 
Secur. Com. v. Kernwn, 232 N. C. 342, 60 S. E. 2d 580. 
Neither could the doctrine be circumvented by the as-
sertion that the charge was improper or groundless and 
would result in irreparable damage (Record on Appeal 
p. 3). See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 
303 U. S. 41, 82 L. Ed. 638, 58 S. Ct. 459; Smith V. 
Highway Board, 117 Vt. 343, 91 A. 2d 805. 
In a case in point, an employer charged with vio-
lation of the wage stabilization provisions of the Defense 
Production Act of 1960, sought to enjoin, as Gallery 
did in the lower court, the holding of a hearing on 
grounds that the Statute did not authorize the proced-
ure contemplated, and that if it did, the Statute was un-
constitutional. The Court held that it would be prema-
ture for it to rule on questions concerning the interpre-
tation or constitutionality of a Statute until after the 
administrative procedures were completed. Allen l\ 
7 
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Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U. S. 535, 98 L. Ed. 
933,75 S. Ct. 745. 
In another case the Court found that the very fact 
constitutional issues were put forward established a 
strong reason for not taking jurisdiction of the suit, in 
order for the Court to attempt to determine, prior to 
such an actual determination by the administrative body, 
what the administrative body's final act and decision 
would be, because the Court found, when the admini-
strative body's procedure was finished it may be pos-
sible that nothing would be left for which the plaintiff 
could complain. Aircraft and D Equipment Corpora-
tion v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 91 L. Ed. 1796, 67 S. Ct. 
1493. 
In still another case, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court refused to grant a motion for injunction assert-
ing unconstitutionality of a Statute prior to administra-
tive hearing, even when the complaint contended it 
would be idle ceremony to follow the procedures out-
lined because the administrative officers would not ad-
mit the section of the act under attack was unconstitu-
tional. Tennessee Emmanual Manufacturing v. Hake, 
183 Tenn. 615, 194 S. W. 2d 468. 
In another case in point, Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 82 L. Ed. 648, 58 S. 
Ct. 459, the U. S. Supreme Court declared that enjoin-
ing the National Labor Relations Board from holding 
a hearing on grounds that it had no jurisdiction would 
8 
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substitute the District Court for the Board as the tri-
bunal to hear and determine what Congress declared 
the Board should exclusively hear and determine in the 
first instance. 
In Lorance v. Colorado, State Board of Exam-
iners of Architect (1972), Colo., App., 505 P . 2d 47, in 
an action seeking a Writ of Prohibition to prevent the 
Board of Examiners of Architects from conducting a 
hearing or further proceeding on a Complaint filed 
against the architect, the Colorado Court of Appeals 
held that the fact that disciplinary proceedings pending 
before the Board was based on alleged violation of the 
Board's regulation, which was assertedly void on its 
face, did not give the courts authority to determine 
whether the Board had jurisdiction to proceed. The 
court asked whether the District Court had jurisdiction 
to prohibit a branch of the executive government from 
carrying out its functions, and it specifically held: 
"The Colorado Supreme Court has consistently 
held that the district court does not have jurisdic-
tion to restrain an administrative agency from 
performing its statutory function." (See also 
Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners v. 
District Court, 138 Colo. 227, 331 P. 2d 502.) 
The City had the right in the first instance to hear 
any matter concerning licenses issued by the Board of 
City Commissioners under authorization of State Law. 
The District Court violated the rule of separation of 
powers by improperly taking jurisdiction prior to hear-
9 
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ing and final determination by the City. The Utah 
Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, however as 
the foregoing cases indicate, the United States Sup-
reme Court and many of our sister states have so ruled. 
POINT I I 
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT H A S NO POW-
E R TO R E V I E W T H E ACTION OF T H E 
CITY BOARD O F COMMISSIONERS U N T I L 
A F T E R T H E ACTION H A S B E E N T A K E N . 
The District Court has power to review the deci-
sion after a hearing and has no power to anticipate 
what the decision of the Board of Commissioners may 
be with regard to revocation of a license. Perhaps the 
case that best states the City's position with regard to 
this matter is the case of Sabes v. Minneapolis (1963), 
120 N. W. 2d 871, which was a liquor license case but 
the findings apply in this case: 
"Basically it is the counsels duty to decide 
whether the licensee has been guilty of such un-
lawful conduct in the operation of its business 
and its continuance is detrimental to the public 
good, (citing cases) In reviewing the proceed-
ings of the municipality, it is not the court's func-
tion to pass on the wisdom of the revocation but 
only to determine whether the counsel exercised 
an honest and reliable discretion or whether it 
acted capriciously, arbitrarily or impulsively, 
(citing cases) For us to assume greater respon-
sibility would constitute an unconstitutional usur-
pation of non-judicial powers, (citing cases)." 
10 
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I t is the City's position that the District Court has 
by its Order usurped the non-judicial powers of the 
City. The court should not intervene in an administra-
tive procedure of this type until the hearing has been 
held and final action taken. 
There are numerous cases, which state the correct 
procedure. In these cases the court has reviewed deci-
sions of administrative bodies after the administrative 
body has conducted its hearing. The court was then 
called upon to determine, as the law allows and requires, 
whether or not the administrative board had functioned 
properly. 
One such case is Ciampa v. City of Chicago (1973), 
12 111. App. 3d 368, 299 N. E. 2d 53. In this case the 
plaintiff, Ciampa, instituted a suit seeking Mandamus 
to compel reinstatement of its Food Purveyors License. 
The Food Purveyors License was revoked without 
hearing by the Mayor on his finding that the licensee 
had sold an obscene magazine at his business establish-
ment. The plaintiff contended, as Gallery did in the 
court below, that this action was a prior restraint on 
freedom of speech. The lower court held that the li-
cense revocation was proper and specifically held: 
"Plaintiff's authorities stand for the general 
proposition that prior restraint on freedom of ex-
pression, such as mass seizure of books or im-
pounding of films, are illegal unless a prior ad-
versary hearing is provided. The defendants do 
not take exception to this general proposition. 
11 
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The action of the Mayor in the present case how-
ever, was not one of seizure or suppression of the 
publication, but rather one of revoking a license 
for cause. We are of the opinion that there is no 
requirement shown under the law which would 
necessitate the Mayor having a prior judicial de-
termination before he can revoke a food purvey-
ors license for a violation involving the sale of 
obscene material." 
In the case at bar, the City was prevented from 
even having the hearing it believes the law required and 
which it intended to provide the plaintiff. 
For a very recent case where an administrative 
body found that a broadcast over the radio was obscene, 
without a prior judicial determination, see Illinois Citi-
zens Committee for Broadcasting v. F.C.C. (11-20-74) 
43 L. W. 2237. Other cases which support the City's 
view of this case are the following: 
1. In the case of the City of Chicago v. Curtland, 
79 F . 2d 963, the Federal Court stated: 
"In the United States Court, it is an estab-
lished rule that whether established facts, found 
by the administrative body, amounts to a viola-
tion, becomes a question of law for the Court. 
The legal question is whether there was sufficient 
evidence before the administrative officer could 
justify finding a violation. Stated otherwise, the 
limited question submitted to the Court was 
whether the administrative officer acted arbitrar-
ily and therefore illegally" (Emphasis added) 
12 
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% Weinstein v. Daley (1967), 85 111. App. 2d 470, 
229 N. E. 2d 357, in Chicago case where the defendant 
requested the Court review an Order of the Liquor 
Commission revoking his retail liquor license. The 
Court held: 
"The Courts consideration of appeal of the 
license revocation brought before it from the 
right and appeal commission is limited to matters 
of record and the Court mjay consider only 
whether the local commission acted arbitrarily 
or in clear abuse of its discretion and whether the 
Order entered by the Commission was contrary 
to the manifest weight of the evidence;' 
3. In D. C. Rydd v. State Board of Health 
(1969) ,202 Kan. 721, 451 P. 2d 239, a Kansas case, the 
defendant appealed from an Order of the Board of 
Health denying the license to operate a Child Care 
Home, the Court stated: 
"The District Court may not, on appeal, sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the administra-
tive tribunal but is restricted to considering, 
whether as a matter of law, the tribunal acted 
fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously, the ad-
ministrative order was substantially supported 
by the evidence in this case, the tribunal's action 
was within the scope of its authority." 
4. In Dubato v. Board of Trustees of the Corpor-
ate Village of Bayville, 166 N. Y. S. 2d 917. The Court 
held: 
"Upon a review of the decision of the Board 
13 
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of Trustees, the Court would not substitute its 
judgment for facts and make a determination 
and decision de novo. This Court will not and 
cannot substitute its own judgment of the facts 
and make a determination and decision of its own 
de novo. I t is limited to the question whether 
the action of the Board was an abuse of discre-
tion and whether it was arbitrary, malicious and 
unreasonable. This Court concludes that there 
was sufficient evidence to sustain the Board's 
finding, determination and decision." 
5. In Nevada Taw Commission v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 
115 (1959), 310 P . 2d 852. The Court carefully delin-
eated the area within which Courts may act on judicial 
review of Commission action. 
". . . it is not the province of the courts to de-
cide what shall be reasonable cause for revoca-
tion of license; that such determination is an ad-
ministrative one to be made by the Commission 
in the exercise of its judgment based upon its 
specialized experience and knowledge. The 
only reviewable question is whether the cause for 
revocation is reasonable." (emphasis added) 
6. The Utah Supreme Court also support the fore-
going decisions in the following case which City be-
lieves to be controlling in the case at bar. In the case of 
Skelton v. Lees (1958), 8 Utah 2d 88, 329 P. 2d 389f 
a civil engineer instituted proceedings in the District 
Court to review and reverse the action of the Director 
of the Department of Registration refusing to register 
and license him as a civil engineer, the Third Judicial 
District Court entered judgment adverse to the Direc-
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tor and others and they appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the decision of the 
Department of Registration and in so doing stated: 
"It is our conclusion that the District Court 
should be limited to the review of the record made 
before the Department of Registration, and is 
thus bound by established rules, applicable to 
such reviews, and determination of an admini-
strative agency should not be reversed merely be-
cause the District Court will interfere only if the 
Department of Registration acted capriciously, 
arbitrarily, or outside the scope of its authirity." 
(See also Peterson v. Industrial Commission 
[1942] 102 U. 175, 129 P . 2d 563; Woodburn v. 
Industrial Commission [1947], 111 U. 393, 181 
P. 2d 209; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Serv-
ice Commission [1956], 5 U. 2d 230, 300 P . 2d 
600.) 
P O I N T I I I 
THE EFFECT OF THE LOWER COURT'S 
RULING IS TO IMPROPERLY CHANGE 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF FROM A CIVIL, 
PREPONDERENCE, TO THE CRIMINAL, 
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, WITH 
THE ADDED BURDEN AND REQUIRE-
MENT THAT THE COURT MUST MAKE 
THE DETERMINATION FIRST, NOT THE 
CITY. 
In any administrative hearing the burden of proof 
is the preponderance of the evidence, and in making 
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such determinations, the administrative body cannot be 
arbitrary or capricious. 
By the Court's Order, the Civil burden of Proof the 
City has for license revocation hearings was eliminated 
and in its place the Court improperly created a new ani-
mal in the law. The requirement that the burden of 
proof be criminal, beyond reasonable doubt, with the 
added requirement that the City cannot make this de-
termination administratively, it must be made prior to 
any such administrative hearing by the criminal court. 
For this reason alone, the lower court should be re-
versed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Decision and Order of the District Court 
should be reversed as exceeding its jurisdiction, and that 
its action was a clear abuse of the equitable discretion 
of the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R O G E R C U T L E R 
City Attorney 
R A Y L. MONTGOMERY 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
Room 101, City and County Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411] 
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